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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The body is an important communicator of people’s feelings, thoughts, and intentions. Facial 
expressions and gestures constitute the two most important means of nonverbal body 
language [1] and have fascinated researchers all over the world [2-8]. 
In face-to-face situations, body language has an important social function both for 
the person generating the action (sender), and the person observing it (observer). Body 
language can be employed voluntarily in order to reinforce a verbal message or to make a 
specific statement, e.g. eye rolling to signal contempt or thumbs up to show approval. 
Conversely, unintentionally produced body language allows the observer to look behind the 
façade of social desirability and detect deception [9, 10]. Some facial expressions and 
gestures can be reliably recognized by most people since they possess cultural or even 
universal validity [11, 12]. In the context of facial expressions these are happiness, sadness, 
disgust, surprise, fear, and anger, typically referred to as basic emotions [2]. Ekman (1992), 
however, does not consider each of the basic emotions as one single affective state but as a 
family of emotional states sharing important characteristics [11].  
Body language is characterized by a high degree of variability and dynamics [11, 13, 
14]. This requires quick adaptability of the observer in order to ensure appropriate social 
functioning. Being able to quickly evaluate the communicative signals of other people also 
has a self-protecting function. Here are three examples: Recognizing the angry facial 
expression of someone approaching us on the street makes us change sides in order to avoid 
physical harm. Becoming aware that the woman we are trying to impress is sitting there with 
legs crossed and an averted gaze while her foot is slightly kicking might prompt us to change 
our strategy in order to prevent disgrace. Detecting incongruence between a friendly verbal 
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message and a malicious facial expression allows us to identify hypocrisy. According to 
Ekman (1969, 1988), people tend to focus their attention more on facial cues than on cues 
from other parts of the body because the face has the highest sending capacity of the body. 
It is not only its most visible part, it has also the shortest transmission time of only seconds 
or fractures of seconds, and can realize a very high variability of stimulus patterns [9, 10].  
Appraisal theories postulate that novelty, valence, and relevance are other important 
criteria during the evaluation of different kinds of stimuli. Identifying whether a facial 
expression or gesture is relevant does not only bear a self-protecting function as mentioned 
earlier but also helps the individual to save cognitive resources necessary for processing 
stimuli of high self-profitability which require more profound processing [15]. Based on 
these theoretical assumptions, Rohr et al. (2012) propose that happy and angry expressions 
are more relevant than fearful and sad expressions because they have behavioral 
implications for the observer. On the contrary, sadness and fear have a self-disclosing 
function for the sender but the corresponding behavioral consequences are more diffuse 
[16]. In other words, the emotion expressions differ in their degree of social impact.  
The functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies of this dissertation focus 
on different aspects of emotional facial expression and gesture evaluation as it might appear 
in social face-to-face situations. These comprise general aspects concerning the effect of 
communicative signals when certain features are varied like their duration and accessibility 
to consciousness, and their social impact. In addition, the evaluative process was subdivided 
into several components in order to disentangle the associated brain areas. Thus, the 
superordinate goal of this dissertation was to contribute to a better understanding of how 
the brain processes emotional body language and which brain circuits become involved in 
different aspects of affect evaluation.  
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2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
“When I wish to find out how wise, or how stupid, or how good, or how wicked is any one, or 
what are his thoughts at the moment, I fashion the expression of my face, as accurately as 
possible, in accordance with the expression of his, and then wait to see what thoughts or 
sentiments arise in my mind or heart, as if to match or correspond with the expression.” 
 
                                                Edgar Allan Poe, The Purloined Letter, In: The Gift 1845, p. 52 [17] 
 
2.1 The concepts of empathy and theory of mind 
 
Emotion research has shown that people tend to match their facial expression to an 
expression they are confronted with, even under conditions of limited awareness [18, 19]. 
There is evidence that these rapid facial reactions should not be interpreted as simple 
physical reactions, but instead appear to reflect some degree of emotional contagion [20, 
21]. A typical example would be the spilling over of a smiling expression to a by-standing 
observer who is unaware of the origin of the happy state of mind in the smiling person.  
Emotional contagion is closely linked to the concept of empathy and can be interpreted as 
one of its components. Empathy describes the capacity of understanding and sharing the 
affective states of others. In other words, empathizing with someone means “putting oneself 
in the shoes of others” in the awareness that the other’s feelings might differ from one’s 
own feelings [22]. According to Preston & De Waal (2002), this is mediated by the automatic 
and unconscious representation of an observed emotional state and the corresponding 
autonomic and somatic reactions in the observing person [23]. Neuroscientific research 
points to two different forms of empathy: Emotional empathy as the basal and automatic 
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empathic response, and cognitive empathy as the active process of inferring other people’s 
emotional states [24-26].  
 
Higher-order empathy conceptually overlaps with theory of mind (ToM). Being able 
to form a ToM allows the individual to attribute mental states like beliefs, intentions or 
emotions to others while simultaneously being aware that these mental states might differ 
from one’s own mental state. The term “theory” arises from the fact that the mental states 
of others are not directly accessible and thus usually cannot be checked for validity [27]. In 
analogy to the concept of empathy, an attempt has been made to differentiate between 
reasoning about an emotional state (affective ToM), and reasoning about other mental 
states that require more cognitive effort like beliefs (cognitive ToM) [28, 29].  
 
The cognitive prerequisites to build metarepresentations necessary for ToM are 
acquired in an accumulating manner beginning in early childhood [30]. By the age of 3-
5 years, toddlers are usually able to understand that other people may have beliefs that can 
differ from their own beliefs and that these may sometimes be wrong. At about this age, 
children also begin to discriminate appearance from reality [31]. This insight is followed by 
the understanding that people can also have beliefs about beliefs (second-order beliefs) [32-
35].  
 
In autistic children, the development of these capacities is impaired which leads to 
severe deficits in forming a ToM and predisposes them for social isolation [36-40]. However, 
despite their deficits in higher order ToM and cognitive perspective-taking, autistics have 
been shown to have preserved basal empathic abilities. The reverse pattern was found in 
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individuals with psychopathic tendencies [41]. These findings support Blair’s theory of ToM 
and empathy as at least partly independent capacities [42]. Recent evidence, however, 
suggests that affective ToM highly draws on empathic skills [43], suggesting that there might 
be common and distinct aspects. The following chapters give an overview about the neural 
bases of ToM and empathy, thereby shedding some light on whether both rely on similar or 
different brain circuits.  
 
 
2.2 Mirror neuron system  
 
Being originally discovered by single cell recordings from area F 5 of the macaque monkey’s 
brain, mirror neurons are a group of neurons that become engaged both during the active 
performance of a motor act and its passive observation in others [44, 45]. Following this 
important discovery in primates, accumulating evidence from functional neuroimaging 
studies has suggested the existence of mirror neurons in the human brain as well [46-48]. 
Especially, the posterior portion of the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) located in Brodmann area 
44 (BA 44), the adjacent premotor cortex (BA 6), and the inferior parietal lobule (IPL) are 
considered to accommodate mirror neurons in the human brain [45]. Activity of the putative 
human mirror neuron system (hMNS) is associated with imitation and imitation learning [49, 
50], thereby providing a direct link to the involvement of the hMNS in automatic rapid facial 
expressions and emotional contagion [51-54]. In line with these findings, the IFG and 
adjacent anterior insula have been suggested to be the key neural substrate of basal forms 
of emotional empathy [25, 26]. Likewise, these regions have been shown to correlate with 
self-reported emotional contagion and empathy [55-57].  
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND|6 
 
Mirror neuron activity is commonly observed in tasks involving all kinds of empathy 
or shared representations [25, 56-58], and facial expressions and gestures appear to act as 
important elicitors of a mirror neuron mediated empathic response [4, 7, 8, 59-62]. 
 
 
2.3 Other neural correlates of empathy and theory of mind 
 
De Waal (2008) understands empathy as a capacity composed of different layers, with 
higher order empathic processes building upon low-level empathy and mirroring 
mechanisms [24]. In line with De Waal’s idea, mirror neuron mediated basal empathic 
reactions are considered to rely on bottom-up processing, whereas cognitive empathy and 
ToM require top-down processing [63].  
 
In the context of top-down processing, the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) has been 
ascribed a key role in ToM, as its activation is commonly accompanied by activity in the 
superior temporal sulcus (STS) or the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), as well as in the 
temporal poles [25, 55, 64-73]. For empathy and ToM, it is of particular importance that the 
brain distinguishes between the self and the other perspective in order to disentangle which 
mental states are intrinsic and extrinsic. If there was no decoupling of self- from other-
related representations, empathizing would result in confusion in the case of contradictory 
affective states between addresser and addressee [74]. In this context, the right hemisphere 
is considered to be highly relevant for processing self-related information [73-76]. 
Differences between the representations of self- and other-perspectives appear to be 
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mediated by parts of the MPFC, STS, TPJ and IPL, while the lateral inferior aPFC was reported 
to be involved in monitoring perspective selection [57, 67, 71, 72, 77, 78].  
 
The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and paracingulate cortex are other regions 
commonly activated during the inference of mental states [55, 57, 65, 68, 69]. ACC generally 
refers to BA 24/32, while the paracingulate cortex is located at the border of BA 32 and BAs 
8/9/10 [79-81]. According to a meta-analysis of various tasks, the pre- and subgenual portion 
of the ACC responds primarily to affective tasks, while its dorsal part is recruited when the 
task is predominantly cognitive [82]. Within the ACC, the anterior mid-cingulate cortex was 
identified as an important neural correlate of cognitive-evaluative forms of empathy [25], a 
finding corroborating Seitz and colleagues’ (2006) interpretation that this area is crucially 
involved in the valuation of thought [83]. Cognitive ToM, also referred to as mentalizing, 
usually engages pregenual parts of the paracingulate cortex [68, 81, 84-86] as well as the 
lateral aPFC [87-89].  
 
In line with De Waal’s (2008) Russion Doll Model of layered components of empathy, 
affective more than cognitive ToM is often accompanied by low-level empathic activation, 
suggesting that in dependence on the task, they share important nodes of an underlying 
brain network [24, 25, 55, 81, 85]. However, this is not mutually exclusive to evidence that 
the brain regions involved in basal empathy, cognitive empathy / affective ToM, and 
cognitive ToM are at least partly dissociable [25, 26, 29, 88, 89].  
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2.4 Brain regions supporting empathy and theory of mind 
 
Empathy and ToM are complex brain functions involving a number of subprocesses which 
are not empathy-inherent but have a supporting effect on it [78]. At first, it is of 
fundamental importance that the cues coming from body language are properly identified 
concerning their formal features. Therefore, it is essential that facial expressions and 
gestures are quickly and accurately visually processed. Among other visual areas, the 
fusiform face area (FFA) and occipital face area (OFA) have been ascribed a crucial role in 
processing facial cues [90, 91]. Hand gestures have been found to be particularly related to 
activation increases in the IPL, intraparietal sulcus, and pre-supplementary motor area (pre-
SMA) [7, 92-95], while processing their motion has been associated with an involvement of 
the STS [78].  
 
 In addition to appropriate stimulus processing, selective attention, working-memory, 
and executive functions come into play as well as they are necessary for successful inference 
of the mental states of others. For example, monitoring one’s attentional focus during 
mental state attribution while simultaneously inhibiting the processing of irrelevant 
information facilitates focusing on the other instead of the self [78]. These higher-order 
functions have been considered to be mediated by the aPFC, especially by its lateral anterior 
parts located in BA 10, with attention being processed slightly more anterior than working-
memory, and multitasking being associated with most anterior activations [87].  
 
The dorsolateral frontal cortex (DLFC), in the context of this dissertation referred to as the 
lateral portions of BAs 8, 9, and 46 [96], has traditionally been linked to the maintenance of 
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cognitive control [97-99], the resolution of cognitive conflict [100, 101], and working-
memory [102, 103]. DLFC activation is frequently observed in empathic and ToM tasks [4, 8, 
55, 56, 81]. This has raised the question whether the DLFC plays a supportive role in ToM or 
whether it is crucially involved in it due to the close relationship between ToM and executive 
functions [33]. Evidence from functional imaging and lesion studies argues for the former 
explanation, showing that ToM and executive functions are mediated by adjacent but clearly 
distinct brain regions [104]. Moreover, performance on ToM and on executive tasks was 
independent from each other in patients with prefrontal lesions [105, 106].  
 
 Recently, the DLFC has come into focus in decision-making research, implicating this 
portion of the prefrontal cortex in normative decisions [107], social decisions [108], 
uncertain or ambiguous decisions [109, 110], economic decisions [111], moral decisions 
[112], and stimulus discrimination or categorization [113-115]. Many tasks that are used to 
study ToM or empathy involved aspects of decision-making, e.g. when the logical ending of a 
story has to be selected [81] or an emotional state has to be chosen from a forced 
alternative choice menu [55].  
 
Taken together, it becomes evident that a number of different brain functions contribute to 
ToM and empathy. They are highly intermingled with both capacities, but are likely 
separable into different neural substrates.  
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3. PRESENT RESEARCH 
 
This dissertation is based on five manuscripts studying different aspects of affective body 
language in healthy subjects from a behavioral and neuroimaging perspective, thereby 
contributing to a refined understanding of the processing of these highly socially relevant 
bodily acts.  
 
In manuscript # 1 [116], the cerebral processing of evolving facial expressions and gestures 
with social impact was examined using fMRI. Being embedded in a valence discrimination 
paradigm, the study focused on two temporally separated points in time within the 
discrimination process. It aimed at disentangling the brain regions activated during 
incomplete and still ambiguous, as well as clearly recognizable and discriminable facial 
expressions and gestures. Manuscript # 2 [117] addressed the question whether facial 
expressions of emotion that occur below the threshold of subjective awareness 
(subliminally) serve as important social cues triggering an automatic empathic response. In 
addition, manuscript # 3 which is based on the same fMRI study as manuscript # 2 [117] 
sheds light on the role of the dorsolateral frontal cortex in affective decisions based on 
subliminal emotional facial cues. In manuscripts # 4 & 5, the cerebral circuits involved in 
empathic reasoning were investigated. While manuscript # 4 focused on the differences in 
processing related to reasoning about emotional states of high and low social impact, 
manuscript # 5 compared the brain activation patterns related to emotional state reasoning 
in young and old adults.  
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3.1 Methodological considerations 
 
All five manuscripts were based on fMRI studies. FMRI as a common non-invasive 
neuroimaging research method permits mapping of brain activation patterns associated with 
specific tasks by measuring the related changes in blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) 
signal changes [118]. It is based on the assumption that a task-induced increase in cerebral 
activity leads to a hemodynamic response (HRF) which is reflected by a decrease of 
deoxygenated haemoglobin whose paramagnetic properties can be captured by fMRI [119]. 
The course of the BOLD signal is mediated by the local concentration of oxygenated and 
deoxygenated haemoglobin. Typically, the BOLD signal in response to a single stimulus event 
can be characterized by a slow increase in cerebral blood flow reaching a peak after 
approximately 5-6 s, and a subsequent decrease resulting in an undershoot before its return 
to baseline [120].  
The common designs used in fMRI research are blocked and event-related designs 
[121, 122]. All manuscripts presented here used event-related designs. While in blocked 
designs same-type stimuli are arranged in short blocks, generally in alternation with resting 
state blocks, these can be presented randomly in event-related designs, allowing for better 
control of habituation and predictability effects [120]. Event-related designs, and especially 
rapid designs, also permit the study of natural-like scenarios with varying types and 
durations of stimuli and varying inter-stimulus-intervals. In an event-related design, the 
event of interest can be the neural responses evoked by an externally presented stimulus 
and / or the subject’s response to them (e.g. button press indicating a choice). 
Due to the delay of the BOLD response, it is possible that HRFs substantially overlap 
and BOLD signals accumulate when stimuli are too closely spaced in fMRI designs. In blocked 
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designs where same-type stimuli are presented in a row, one aims at capturing the 
accumulated BOLD signal which typically reflects sustained cerebral activity. In event-related 
designs, however, transient activity in response to consecutive events can be measured 
[123]. Typically, in modern designs, the events are presented in randomized order and in 
rapid succession which does not allow the HRF to return to baseline after every event. In 
later data-analysis the problem of overlapping HRFs is resolved by deconvolving the HRF in 
order to assign each HRF to its corresponding event [120]. For this reason, rapid event-
related designs require exact data logging and more fine-grained data analysis compared to 
blocked designs.  
 
3.2 Summary of manuscript # 1 
 
As stated in the introductory chapter, studying the effects of emotional body language has 
fascinated researchers all over the world. Interestingly, despite some exceptions [60, 124, 
125], most studies examining the brain areas activated during confrontation with facial 
expressions used static expressions as stimuli [8, 59, 126-129], while the neural correlates of 
gestures or body movements conveying an emotional message are mainly studied using 
video-clips [4, 7, 94]. In real life social interactions, both gestures and facial expressions are 
highly dynamic. Accordingly, dynamic expressions were shown to provoke stronger and 
differing neural responses than static pictures [124, 130]. For these reasons, manuscript # 1 
aimed at mapping and comparing the brain activation patterns related to facial expressions 
and gestures which dynamically evolved from (emotionally) neutral to meaningful. Viewing 
the evolving stimuli was embedded in a valence discrimination paradigm in which the 
subjects were instructed to watch the video-clips carefully and to indicate by a button press 
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whether the facial expression seen showed anger or whether the seen gesture seen 
conveyed a negative meaning. By capturing brain activity at a time where the expressions 
were still incomplete and thus ambiguous and a subsequent point in time when the subjects 
were able to discriminate them by their button press, manuscript # 1 [116] also allowed for a 
more fine-grained look at the corresponding cerebral processes likely to occur in social 
encounters.  
 Previous research has shown that a broad cerebral network including occipito-
temporal, parietal and frontal areas becomes active when people recognize facial 
expressions gestures with social impact [5, 7, 131]. Specifically, it has been shown that 
nonverbal body language activates brain areas that have been associated with the putative 
hMNS [7, 56, 57, 59]. The IFG as a core structure of the hMNS has been suggested to be 
crucial for basal emotional empathy [25, 26, 60]. Higher order empathy or ToM, respectively, 
has been found to elicit activation of the medial frontal cortex [8, 25, 63, 66, 73, 83, 132, 
133]. Therefore, in manuscript # 1 [116] it was hypothesized that viewing incompletely 
evolved facial expressions and gestures of high social impact elicited activity in the IFG and 
medial frontal cortex due to their key roles in mirror neuron mediated basal empathy, and 
affective ToM. In addition, DLFC activation was expected to occur at the subsequent point in 
time related to the discrimination between angry and other facial expressions, and gestures 
of negative and positive valence, respectively. The second hypothesis was based on past 
findings implicating the DLFC in ambiguous decision-making [110], stimulus discrimination 
[115], and information manipulation [134].  
 Manuscript # 1 [116] presents fMRI data from a sample of sixteen healthy right 
handers with normal emotional competence as obtained by the Toronto Alexithymia Scale 
(TAS-20) [135, 136]. As expected, early stages of viewing the incompletely evolved facial 
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expressions and gestures not only lead to activation of temporal areas associated with a 
formal visual analysis, but also activated the IFG and parts of the dorsomedial frontal cortex 
(DMFC) in both hemispheres. This suggested both, an automatic empathic response, and the 
subjective valuation of their social meaning. Right-left comparisons of the extracted 
parameter estimates revealed stronger activations in the right inferior temporal gyrus and 
right DMFC supporting the notion of right hemisphere dominance in processing emotion. In 
line with previous research, discriminating the facial expressions at a later stage of their 
evolution went along with an activation increase in the DLFC. Taken together, manuscript # 1 
[116] sheds further light on the neural circuits involved in the intuitive understanding of 
nonverbal body language and affective decision-making.  
 
3.3 Summary of manuscript # 2 
 
 Building on manuscript # 1 [116], manuscript # 2 [117] concentrated on another 
important characteristic of facial expressions as one of the most important means of 
emotional body language. In everyday social encounters, people are confronted with a large 
number of social stimuli conveying messages about the emotional state of the counterpart. 
Typically, and among others, verbal information is accompanied by affective prosody, 
gestures, and facial expressions of emotion. Due to the short appearance and strong 
dynamics of these communication signals, as well as limited attention capacity, people might 
not be aware of all these stimuli at every moment during a conversation. They might, 
however, nevertheless experience a ‘gut feeling’ giving them information about the 
emotional state of their counterpart. This is of particular importance when the nonverbal 
message contradicts the verbal message. One crucial factor contributing to peoples ‘gut 
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feeling’ in situations as just described might be affective priming. According to the affective 
primacy hypothesis [137], affective reactions can be elicited in a person even when the 
affect generating stimulus is very short and not consciously accessible. In other words, the 
affective response occurs in the virtual absence of additional cognitive processing.  
 In fact, it has been repeatedly shown that emotional facial expressions that are 
presented below the level of subjective awareness affect peoples’ behavior, judgments, and 
brain activation patterns [138-141]. From manuscript # 1 [116] and past research carried out 
by others, we knew that an empathic response as shown by activation of bottom-up 
modulated mirror neuron associated brain areas and top-down modulated higher order 
prefrontal areas can be evoked by consciously accessible facial expressions of emotion [8, 
57, 59, 116]. Beyond that, there is increasing evidence that similar empathy-associated 
regions become active when the expressions are presented outside of subjective awareness 
[142-144].  
Thus, one aim of manuscript # 2 [117] was to replicate and extend these findings by 
comparing conditions of supra- (400 ms, consciously accessible) and subliminal (40 ms, 
consciously not accessible) face presentation in the framework of an emotional adjective 
forced choice paradigm using event-related fMRI. Importantly, unlike some other studies 
[145], we applied a masking procedure in which a subliminal emotional expression (40 ms) 
was masked by a neutral expression (360 ms) of the same actor, thereby creating a more 
natural setting. We hypothesized that regardless of their conscious accessibility, supra- and 
subliminal emotional facial expressions elicit activation in the empathy and face processing 
network as evident from event-related fMRI.  
In addition to the fMRI study, a behavioral study was performed in order to control 
different aspects of the subliminal presentation. For example, according to the affective 
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primacy hypothesis [137], affective reactions evoked by subliminal information are diffuse 
and general. However, recent evidence suggests that processing of not consciously 
accessible facial expressions was not reduced to a global valence-based level but that there 
was a certain degree of specificity in relation to the subjective relevance of an emotional 
state to the observer [16]. Manuscript # 2 [117] therefore used emotional facial expressions 
which in line with theoretical assumptions [15, 16] were considered to have high behavioral 
relevance for the observer (happy, angry) or were less self-profitable (sad). Moreover, the 
behavioral study contained control conditions in which either only the neutral face mask was 
shown or in which the subliminal emotional expression was replaced by a non-emotional 
nonsense screen. The behavioral study aimed at showing that subliminal emotional 
information was able to influence people’s judgments in a relevance-dependent and specific 
manner. 
Manuscript # 2 [117] presents behavioral data from a sample of twenty-three healthy 
volunteers and fMRI data from a sample of twelve healthy right handers. All subjects were 
pre-selected based on pre-defined inclusion criteria including unimpaired general emotional 
competence (Toronto Alexithymia Scale, TAS-20) [135, 136], mood (Beck’s Depression 
Inventory) [146], and empathy (Saarbrücker Persönlichkeitsfragebogen, German adaptation 
of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index, available online). Testing and scanning was followed by 
a debriefing interview with increasingly specific question about the stimuli and the rationale 
of the study to assure unawareness of the subliminal stimuli. As hypothesized, the 
behavioral study confirmed that the emotional information of facial expressions presented 
outside of conscious awareness spilled over onto the neutral expression mask and 
influenced the subjects’ judgments in the emotional adjective forced choice paradigm. Our 
data revealed a strong global valence positive-negative discrimination effect but for a 
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discrimination between highly relevant and less relevant emotional expressions as shown by 
Rohr and colleagues (2012) only a trend was observed [16]. On the neural level, consciously 
accessible and subliminal emotional facial expressions shared a widespread network of brain 
areas including the FFA [90], the TPJ, as well as inferior, dorsolateral, and medial frontal 
regions. Taken together, manuscript # 2 [117] shows that emotional facial expressions that 
occur outside of subjective awareness can function as important triggers of empathic 
reactions and are able to alter people’s judgments.  
 
 
3.4 Summary of manuscript # 3 
 
Being based on the same fMRI study as manuscript # 2 [117], manuscript # 3 focuses on the 
role of the DLFC in affective decisions based on subliminal emotional information. The DLFC 
known as a higher order control region [101, 147] which has come into focus in decision-
making research [110, 111, 148, 149], and which we also identified as crucial for affective 
decisions in manuscripts # 1 & 2 [116].  
 The manuscript’s rationale was based on the theoretical assumption that a decision 
cannot be seen as one single process but instead consists of several partly interacting sub-
processes. The decision itself is preceded by a pre-decision phase during which decision 
values are calculated and compared, and is followed by a post-decision consolidation phase 
[150]. The emotional adjective forced choice paradigm already mentioned in the description 
of manuscript # 2 [117] permitted us to capture brain activation changes during presentation 
of the masked subliminal facial expressions prior to the actual decision taking place when 
the subjects made their emotional adjective choice. We hypothesized that the DLFC is 
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involved in both, the pre-decision phase when most likely decision values were calculated 
and the decision itself [107, 108, 151]. In more detail, we expected a topographic diversity 
reflecting a certain degree of functional specialization within the DLFC [96, 97]. Specifically, it 
was hypothesized that functional specialization would be reflected by different patterns of 
interareal connectivity. To corroborate this hypothesis, fMRI data analysis was 
complemented by meta-analytic connectivity modeling (MACM) based on the clusters of 
activation found in the DLFC.  
 It was shown that the preparatory phase of the decision during which the subject 
evaluated the masked subliminal facial expressions went along with an activation increase in 
a right posterior portion of the DLFC. The MACM analysis revealed co-activations in the left 
IFG. In contrast, the decision itself was associated with activity in a more anterior portion 
within the right DLFC which featured co-activations in its left homotope, the adjacent 
premotor cortices, the DMFC, the left pre-SMA, and the left intraparietal sulcus. The results 
argue for partially independent sub-regions within the large DLFC which are suitable to 
support the notion of dual associative processes in intuitive judgment [152]. While the 
posterior DLFC sub-region became engaged early during the decision process, the anterior 
sub-region appeared to be crucial for the actual decision based on ambiguous information 
[107-111].  
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3.5 Summary of manuscript # 4 
 
The ability to infer the emotions, intentions, and beliefs of others from their body language 
is fundamental in social interactions. On the one hand it can help consolidate interpersonal 
relationships, and on the other hand it bears a self-protecting function.  
 In social encounters, facial expressions as one central means of body language are an 
important source of information about a particular emotional state of another person. 
Manuscripts # 1-3 [116, 117], as well as a broad body of literature, have shown that facial 
cues also act as key players in eliciting an empathic response in the observer [8, 59, 60, 66, 
116, 153]. As already taken into account in manuscript # 2 [117], facial expressions of 
emotion differ in their degree of behavioral relevance for the observer [15, 16], and thus can 
be considered to have either high or low social impact. 
 Manuscript # 4 aimed at mapping the brain areas related to emotional state 
reasoning using a paradigm in which the subjects were asked to attribute an emotional state 
seen in a depersonalized emotional facial expression [154] to one of four short descriptions 
of affect-laden situations. Importantly, the paradigm did not require explicit facial affect 
recognition since the emotional facial expressions were expected to evoke an automatic 
empathic response (see manuscript # 1, [116]). However, inferring the cause of a particular 
emotional state required the ability to form a ToM. In our paradigm reasoning about the 
emotional state itself would theoretically refer to the concept of affective ToM while 
conclusions of its origin would extend affective ToM abilities and require a cognitive ToM 
[29, 88]. Furthermore, based on theoretical assumptions explained earlier [15, 16], some 
emotional states represented by the facial expressions had high social impact because they 
were highly self-profitable, while others were considered to have low social impact. Thus, 
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one additional goal of manuscript # 4 was to explore whether there was a difference in how 
the brain processes emotional facial expressions and reasoning associated with either high 
or low social impact.  
We hypothesized that high social impact expressions were preferentially processed due to a 
salience effect, thereby initially binding more cognitive resources, but finally leading to a 
more accurate reasoning performance than low social impact expressions. On the neural 
level, we expected this to be reflected by more pronounced recruitment of mirror neuron 
related brain regions mediating a basal empathic response such as the IFG and the IPL [25, 
54, 56, 57, 59, 69, 116]. As a consequence of more efficient processing of high social impact 
expressions, we expected reasoning about emotional states of high social impact to elicit 
stronger activations in higher order top-down modulated prefrontal areas such as the ACC or 
paracingulate cortex [25, 68, 86], the pre-SMA ([8, 83, 116], see also manuscript # 1), the STS 
[64, 155], the aPFC [87], and the DLFC ([109, 116], see also manuscripts # 1-3) as compared 
to reasoning about low social impact expressions.  
 Manuscript # 4 presents fMRI and behavioral data from a sample of twenty-six 
healthy right handers with normal neutral face recognition, mood, general emotional 
competence, self-reported empathy, and facial affect recognition ability ([135, 136, 146, 
156]; Saarbrücker Persönlichkeitsfragebogen available online). Our behavioral data revealed 
that accuracy of reasoning about high impact facial expressions was significantly higher, and 
was characterized by a prolonged response latency as compared to reasoning about low 
impact expressions. However, according to correlation analyses, the accuracy related to high 
social impact emotional states was higher, the less time the subjects took for the reasoning 
process, while the contrary pattern was found for low impact emotional states. On the 
neural level, we expected mirror neuron activity during viewing of facial expressions as an 
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expression of basal empathy. Indeed, high social impact facial expressions activated the IPL, 
while low social impact expressions led to an activation increase in the right premotor cortex 
[58]. However, contrary to our hypothesis, directly comparing expressions of high and low 
social impact did not yield any differences in mirror neuron related areas. Reasoning about 
high and low social impact emotional states activated brain regions located in the inferior 
frontal cortex, anterior insula, the paracingulate cortex and superior DMFC, among others. 
While contrasting reasoning related to high with reasoning about low social impact states 
did not yield any differences in brain activation, more pronounced activity in the 
parahippocampal gyrus, the lateral superior dorsomedial frontal, dorsolateral and 
inferiolateral anterior prefrontal cortex was found in favor of reasoning about low impact 
expressions.  
 Taken together, our data suggest that facial expressions as the basis of emotional 
state reasoning elicit mirror neuron activity in the brain, regardless whether they are of high 
or low social impact for the observer [58]. However, we found differences in the way the 
brain processed reasoning about emotional states of high social impact as compared to low 
social impact. Although higher order empathy and decision-making associated regions ([72, 
88, 89, 116], see also manuscript # 1) were more strongly recruited during reasoning about 
low social impact expressions, this did not lead to a higher rate of accuracy as compared to 
reasoning about high social impact emotional states. Instead, our data suggest that when an 
emotional state is not directly linked to self-profitability, the brain on the one hand requires 
more cognitive resources to respond to it which on the other hand does not necessarily 
result in better outcomes.  
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3.6 Summary of manuscript # 5:  
 
Manuscript # 5 is based on the same data and study design as manuscript # 4, but has a 
different focus. While manuscript # 4 addressed the question of whether there are 
differences in the way the brain processes reasoning about emotional states of high and low 
social impact, manuscript # 5 compared young (22-39 years) and old adults’ (42-61 years) 
performance on the empathic reasoning paradigm, and aimed at detecting differences in the 
brain activation patterns of young and old adults and the way the brain handles the task.  
 The rationale of manuscript # 5 was derived from observations that the ability to 
build a ToM declines with age [157-159], and that the observed impairment appears to be 
global in nature [160]. However, recent evidence suggested a motivational component in 
ToM tasks, showing that the deficit in old adults was restricted to topics which were of low 
relevance to them [161].  
One goal of manuscript # 5 was to replicate the findings of a ToM deficit in old adults 
found in past research. Therefore, old and young adults completed several standardized 
questionnaires assessing their mood, general emotional competence, and self-reported 
empathy ([135, 136, 146, 156]; Saarbrücker Persönlichkeitsfragebogen available online). 
Following the actual empathic reasoning task, they were furthermore required to complete 
an explicit facial affect recognition task in order to exclude impaired facial affect recognition 
abilities as a confounding factor as found by others [162]. By comparing reasoning accuracy 
associated with high and low social impact emotional states (for theoretical assumptions see 
descriptions of manuscripts # 2 & 4) between old and young adults, manuscript # 5 also 
aimed at shedding light on the relevance effect observed by Richter & Kunzmann [161].  
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 While there is a broad body of literature examining the brain regions involved in 
empathy and ToM in young adults [8, 55-57, 69, 71, 86, 116, 117]; see also 
manuscripts # 1, 2 & 4), neuroimaging data in old adults is virtually lacking. In the context of 
empathy, some evidence suggests that viewing stigmatized people resulted in stronger 
activation in a lateral medial prefrontal area in old adults as compared to young adults. Also, 
in high functioning old adults stronger activation in the inferior frontal cortex associated 
with the regulation of emotional responses was observed [163]. In addition, Charlton and 
colleagues (2009) found a correlation between ToM performance and white matter integrity 
in young and old adults and presumed that as a consequence in old age white matter 
connections relevant for ToM could be altered [164]. To the best of our knowledge, there 
are no neuroimaging studies investigating the brain activation patterns underlying the 
differences between young and old adults in emotional state reasoning. Manuscript # 5 
attempted to fill this gap by contrasting young and old adults’ brain regions during viewing 
facial expressions as the basis for evaluation, and subsequent reasoning about their 
emotional state as reflected by the attribution of one of four descriptions of affect-laden 
situations. 
 We hypothesized that older adults require more cognitive resources to manage the 
task when compared to young adults. Although we expected young and old adults to share 
important primarily bottom-up modulated empathy-related areas, we hypothesized that due 
to the stronger reliance on cognitive resources, old adults exhibit stronger activation 
increases in top-down modulated lateral and medial prefrontal areas associated with higher 
order control functions, empathy and affective ToM [8, 57, 58, 63, 87]. Moreover, we 
predicted basal empathy-associated areas like the IFG and the IPL to correlate with self-
reported empathy and explicit facial affect recognition abilities [55, 56], whereas we 
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expected higher order empathy or ToM areas such as the aPFC, the ACC or paracingulate 
cortex or the superior DMFC to be associated with reasoning accuracy [8, 79, 83, 87, 116]. 
 Manuscript # 5 presented behavioral and fMRI data from twelve old adults and 
fourteen young adults showing that both recruited similar bottom-up and top-down 
modulated brain areas reflecting empathy, ToM, and cognitive control related activity [25, 
82, 83, 87, 116]. Instead of being reflected by the recruitment of other brain circuits, the 
difference between both groups became apparent in the time course the regions became 
activated during the empathic reasoning paradigm. While the time course of old adults was 
characterized by an early engagement of higher order control regions during viewing the 
facial expressions, in young adults these became first activated when all necessary 
information for a goal-directed response was available. Taken together, manuscript # 5 
suggests that the impairment in emotional state reasoning which is found consistently in old 
adults most likely resulted from an inefficient mechanism leading to a recruitment of higher 
order prefrontal areas at a too early stage during the reasoning process, thereby binding 
necessary cognitive resources to successfully accomplish the task [165]. 
 
4. DISCUSSION AND OUTLOOK 
 
This dissertation aimed at mapping the brain activation patterns associated with different 
aspects of emotional body language from an observer’s perspective. These were common 
attributes of facial expressions and gestures which characterize them in everyday social 
situations: dynamics, ambiguity, accessibility to consciousness, and social impact. In 
addition, we were interested in the neural correlates of decisions in an affective context. 
This was based on the rationale that decision-making is an integral part of everyday life, 
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thereby giving the individual the opportunity to ensure its well-being and to consolidate 
relationships. Finally, with respect to findings of a decline in ToM with increasing age, the 
brain activation patterns related to emotional state reasoning were compared in young and 
old adults.  
This discussion is structured as follows: first, the impact of the different facial 
expression and gesture inherent attributes and their most important neural correlates are 
discussed. Thereafter, the discussion focuses on the decision aspect of the paradigms used. 
In a final step, the differences in the neural circuits of young and old adults are discussed 
with emphasis on possible explanations of the obtained results.  
 
 Manuscript # 1 [116] focused on the first two aspects, dynamics and ambiguity, by 
capturing the BOLD signal increases during evolving but not yet clearly recognizable 
emotional facial expressions and gestures. We found activation in the putative hMNS, as 
well as in the superior portion of the DMFC extending to the pre-SMA. Manuscript # 2 [117] 
showed that facial expressions which were presented outside of conscious awareness 
affected the evaluation of subsequent neutral expressions by adding an emotional flavor 
that altered the subjects’ judgments. The fMRI data analysis yielded a similar pattern of 
activations as manuscript # 1 [116] when mapping the brain regions associated with 
consciously accessible and not consciously accessible facial expressions of emotion. 
However, while both elicited strong activation in the hMNS, supraliminal expressions 
additionally recruited the pre-SMA. In manuscript # 4, the neural correlates of viewing and 
subsequently reasoning about facial expressions of high and low social impact were 
compared. Both, viewing high impact and low impact expressions, yielded activations in 
mirror neuron related brain areas. Beyond the hMNS, reasoning about the corresponding 
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emotional states of either high or low social impact also engaged parts of the DMFC, 
primarily located in BA 8, and the aPFC. Reasoning about low impact expressions as 
compared to reasoning about emotional states of high impact yielded stronger activations in 
the DMFC and inferolateral aPFC.  
 
 Taken together, our studies consistently activated parts of the putative hMNS, and 
are thus in line with previous research on empathy and ToM [8, 55-57, 60, 69]. In more 
detail, mirror neurons were recruited when the subjects were confronted with dynamically 
evolving but still ambiguous emotional body language (manuscript # 1 [116]), as well as 
static supraliminal and masked subliminal facial expressions of emotion (manuscript # 2 
[117]), and during viewing facial expressions of high and low social impact (manuscript # 4). 
They were also involved in judgments about masked subliminal expressions (manuscript # 3) 
and reasoning about emotional states of high and low social impact (manuscript # 4). 
Especially, the IFG and adjacent anterior insula which have been suggested to represent a 
key neural substrate of an automatic bottom-up modulated empathic response [25, 26] and 
have been shown to correlate with self-reported empathy [55] were involved in these tasks. 
Importantly, while in manuscripts # 4 & 5 the subjects were instructed to empathize with the 
presented facial expressions, no such instruction was given in manuscripts # 1-3 [116, 117], 
corroborating the assumption that mirroring takes place automatically [45, 58, 63]. Here we 
additionally show that the putative hMNS appears to become activated regardless of 
whether an emotional expression was still ambiguous or clearly recognizable, consciously 
accessible or not, or related to an emotional state of high or low social impact.  
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Manuscripts # 1-4 [116, 117] consistently found DMFC activation, although the tasks were 
slightly different (see Figure 1 for an overview). In manuscripts # 1 & 2 [116, 117], a cluster 
of activation was located in the pre-SMA. Activity in anatomically overlapping areas was 
found in tasks requiring the formation of a ToM, predominantly an affective ToM with a self-
referential component [4, 56, 57, 59, 86]. Seitz and colleagues therefore proposed that the 
pre-SMA might represent an important relay between an observed external mental state 
and the internal frame of reference [8, 83]. Notably, according to a recent activation 
likelihood estimation (ALE) based meta-analysis, its activity was primarily related to external, 
not self agency [166].  
 
In manuscripts # 3 & 4, the DMFC activations were located more anterior in the 
medial and superior frontal gyrus of BA 8, extending to the dorsal portion of the 
paracingulate cortex and ACC (BA 32). Corresponding to the so-called cognitive subdivision 
of the ACC [82], activity increases in similar brain regions have been found in predominantly 
cognitive ToM tasks [64, 68, 72, 86]. However, there is also evidence for an involvement of 
these areas in affective ToM [25, 57, 89, 167]. Activation of the DMFC (BA 8) overlapped with 
an activation increase that was observed during viewing of evolving but not yet recognizable 
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Figure 1 Location of activation peaks related to the different studies 
within in the DMFC. 
All peaks of activation are superimposed on x = -1 in Talairach space. 
The white line marks the AC-PC plane. 
1 = manuscript # 4: reasoning about low impact emotional states, 
2 = manuscript # 3: decisions based on subliminal information, 
3 = manuscript # 4: reasoning about high impact emotional states, 
4 = manuscript # 1: viewing evolving emotional facial expressions,  
5 = manuscript # 4: reasoning about high impact emotional states, 
6 = manuscript # 1: viewing evolving gestures, 
7 = manuscript # 2: viewing supraliminal emotional facial expressions 
 
 
 facial expressions, and their subsequent discrimination (cf. manuscript # 1 [116]). The latter 
study did not involve an explicit instruction to empathize with the expression, but instead 
required the subjects to detect whether a seen evolving expression represented anger or 
not. However, the engagement of the DMFC (BA 8) suggested that at least some degree of 
cognitive empathy / affective ToM was involved. Interestingly, a more laterally located 
cluster of activation in dorsomedial BA 8 was observed in manuscript # 4 when comparing 
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reasoning about emotional states of low impact with reasoning about those of high social 
impact. The lateral DMFC activation corresponded to activations reported by others during 
confrontation with social eye gaze [86], reading ToM stories [65], and inference of the 
mental state of dissimilar others [72]. In addition, activation of the lateral portion of 
dorsomedial BA 8 has been shown to be strongly associated with the processing of 
uncertainty [168] which might have been a contributing factor in the above-mentioned 
studies as well. It also fits our observations of stronger engagement of this area during 
inference of emotional states of low social impact because these were considered to be 
associated with only diffuse behavioral consequences for the observer [16]. 
 
As explained in the introductory chapter, inferring other’s mental states cannot be 
considered a purely curiosity-driven process since it fulfills an important social function. The 
close relationship of ToM and decision-making becomes evident when imagining the 
consequences if someone correctly identified his / her counterpart’s aggressive state of 
mind but did not decide to leave the situation. In other words, forming a ToM is 
dysfunctional when it does not lead to the appropriate context-dependent conclusions. For 
this reason, a decision aspect can be found in all studies conducted in the context of this 
dissertation. In manuscript # 1 [116], the subjects had to decide whether an evolving facial 
expression was angry or not, and whether a dynamic gesture was friendly or threatening. In 
manuscripts # 2 [117] & 3, the adjective had to be chosen that best reflected the emotional 
state seen in a previous supraliminal or masked subliminal face. And finally, in 
manuscripts # 4 & 5, the subjects were required to choose one out of four possible situations 
which most likely was the origin of a previously seen facial expression. In all studies, affect-
related decisions went along with activation in the DLFC (see Figure 2 for an overview). This 
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Figure 1 Location of activation peaks related to the different studies 
within in the DLFC.  
All peaks of activation are superimposed on z = 30 (transversal view) in 
Talairach space in order to show their location in anterior-posterior 
direction. They grey line marks the borderline between the posterior 
section related to the preparatory stage of decision, and the anterior 
section related to the decision itself. 
1 = manuscript # 4: reasoning about high impact emotional states, 
2 = manuscript # 3: decisions based on subliminal information, 
3 = manuscript # 1: discrimination of emotional facial expressions, 
4 = manuscript # 2: viewing subliminal emotional facial expressions,  
5 = manuscript # 2: viewing supraliminal emotional facial expressions, 
6 = manuscript # 4: reasoning about low impact emotional states, 
7 = manuscript # 4: reasoning about low impact emotional states, 
8 = manuscript # 4: reasoning about high impact emotional states 
 
 result concurred with findings from the literature, implicating the DLFC in various kinds of 
decisions [107-111, 113, 114], as well as guessing [169] and decision conflict [170]. Many of 
these studies involved social or moral aspects [107, 108, 112], uncertainty or ambiguity [109, 
110], or emotional aspects [111, 113, 149, 171], aspects which might be related to our tasks.  
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In manuscript # 3, we sought to disentangle the role of the DLFC in different phases 
within the decision process, based on Svenson’s (1996) Differentiation and Consolidation 
Theory [150]. According to the theory, decisions have a preparation phase during which a 
comparison of choice alternatives and the attribution of decision values takes place, the 
moment of the decision itself, and a post-decision consolidation phase. In our study (cf. 
manuscript # 3), the preparatory stage of the decision represented by facial stimuli as the 
basis on which subsequently an adjective could had to be chosen, was associated with 
activity in the posterior portion of the DLFC. The actual decision yielded an activation 
increase in a more anterior part of the DLFC. A similar pattern of DLFC activations was 
observed in manuscript # 1 [116]. While the main effect of early stage facial expression and 
gesture observation led to an activation of the posterior DLFC, its activity was located more 
anterior but not as anterior as in manuscript # 3 during their discrimination. Manuscript # 4 
failed to show DLFC activity during the preparatory decision phase but choosing a situation 
that might have happened to the previously seen person yielded several activation clusters 
in the anterior portion of the DLFC. The anterior DLFC was also found to be more strongly 
engaged during reasoning about low social impact emotional states compared to high 
impact emotional states, probably because the decision was perceived as more difficult and 
required more cognitive resources due to the diffuse behavioral implications.  
Beyond mapping the DLFC activation associated with the pre-decision phase and the 
decision itself, manuscript # 4 also aimed at identifying the co-activation patterns of the 
anterior and posterior DLFC. While the latter featured co-activations in the left IFG, anterior 
DLFC was accompanied by premotor, DMFC, pre-SMA, and parietal activations. Although the 
left IFG has traditionally been associated with Broca’s speech area [172] and might therefore 
reflect covert speech, it has also been identified as a key player in mediating a basal 
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empathic reaction [25, 26]. In our studies (cf. manuscripts # 1-3, [116, 117]) posterior DLFC 
activity was consistently accompanied by activation in the inferior frontal cortex, and at the 
time when posterior DLFC activity occurred, no speech component was present in the 
paradigms. Contrary to the co-activation patterns observed in the meta-analysis 
(cf. manuscript # 3), in our studies pre-SMA activation was primarily found prior to the actual 
decision. As discussed earlier, pre-SMA activity might reflect the embedding of an externally 
perceived mental state into one’s own frame of reference [83], and thus it is not 
contradicting that it was observed already during the preparatory stage of affect-based 
decisions. Broader DMFC activation most likely reflecting cognitive empathy / affective ToM 
occurred during both, the pre-decision phase (cf. manuscript # 1, [116]), and the actual 
decision (cf. manuscripts # 3 & 4), and was thus in line with the results obtained by the 
meta-analysis (cf. manuscript # 3).  
As described in chapter 2.3, DLFC activity has not only been found in decision-making 
paradigms but also in various other tasks involving executive functioning [99-101, 173]. It is 
impossible to completely disentangle whether an activation increase observed in the DLFC 
reflected one or the other since many executive tasks appear to implicitly study decision-
making [98-100, 173, 174] and vice versa [109, 175]. In our studies, we carefully chose our 
control conditions in order to subtract signal changes related to processes we did not wish to 
study. For example, in manuscript # 1 [116], deciding whether an evolving facial expression 
reflected anger or not was contrasted with alternating button presses in response to the 
same evolving stimuli. This permitted us not only to subtract motor-related activity but also 
some degree of executive function-related activity because the subjects also had to monitor 
the screen and their motor response carefully. However, as stated earlier, there is no perfect 
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control condition, and thus it is still possible that executive function has contributed to DLFC 
activation in our task.  
 
In summary, it was shown that brain areas considered accommodating mirror 
neurons like the IFG and the IPL, as well as parts of the DMFC are recruited during the 
processing of emotional body language. Our data further supports the notion that an 
empathic response is generated automatically, as well as intentionally initiated when people 
are confronted with emotional facial expressions or gestures, regardless of whether they are 
dynamic or static, still ambiguous or clearly recognizable, consciously accessible or not, or 
have high or low social impact. Moreover, we show that the DLFC is involved in affect-based 
decisions, and provide first evidence that there might be at least some degree of functional 
specialization in the representation of pre-decision processing and the decision itself.  
 
A vast body of behavioral evidence shows that the ability to form a ToM declines with 
age [158-160, 176-179]. Based on these observations, we compared empathic reasoning 
abilities of young and old adults while simultaneously mapping their brain activation 
patterns (cf. manuscript # 5). Both groups did not differ in educational level, general face 
recognition, mood, self-reported emotional competence and empathy, as well as explicit 
facial affect recognition. Assessment of affective ToM abilities revealed that old adults 
performed as well as young adults when they had to select one out of four emotional 
attributes that best described the emotional state of a pair of eyes (Eyes Test) [180]. 
However, they performed worse when they were required to attribute one out of four 
affect-laden situations to a previously seen depersonalized face, independent of whether the 
facial expression reflected an emotional state of high or low impact. This result stands in 
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contrast to findings of Richter & Kunzmann (2011) who showed that the differences 
between old and young adults vanished when the self-relevance for old adults was increased 
[161]. Following theoretical assumptions based on appraisal theories [15, 16], we considered 
angry and happy expressions to be of high social impact because of their high degree of self-
profitability and their clear behavioral implications. Thus, these expressions must have 
signaled high relevance to both, young and old adults, which should have led to an 
adjustment of performance levels. Since that was not the case, we assume that motivation 
was not the major factor explaining the age-related differences in affective ToM. Compared 
to young adults, old adults exhibited similar response latencies during inference of high 
impact emotional states, but responded significantly faster when reasoning about low social 
impact emotional states was required.  
 
On the neural level, we observed striking differences between both age groups. 
During the viewing of the facial expressions to which subsequently an affect-laden situation 
had to be attributed, old adults showed stronger activations in mirror neuron related brain 
areas, as well as dorsomedial and dorsolateral frontal, and anterior prefrontal regions. In 
contrast, during actual emotional state reasoning, the young adults exhibited stronger 
activity in a similar but aPFC and ACC / paracingulate cortex dominated network. In 
combination with the behavioral results, these findings argue for an inefficient mechanism in 
performing and processing the task in old adults. Even though both groups recruited similar 
brain areas which are known to be involved in basal empathy, affective ToM, and cognitive 
control [25, 57, 87, 89], there were important differences in the neural time course of when 
they were recruited. Higher-order aPFC areas might have been activated at a too early stage 
of reasoning, thereby upregulating other top-down modulated ToM areas at a point in time 
DISCUSSION AND OUTLOOK|35 
when a goal-directed response was not yet possible [165]. In addition, the early engagement 
of higher-order areas most likely bound cognitive resources in old adults that might have 
additionally hampered subsequent reasoning. In young adults, on the contrary, ToM and 
higher-order control associated areas in the ACC / paracingulate cortex and aPFC were first 
recruited during actual reasoning which might represent better cognitive resource 
management and more goal-directed processing [25, 55, 69, 165, 181].  
 
Possible limitations of the current studies should not go unmentioned. First, 
manuscripts # 1 & 2 [116, 117] aimed at capturing brain activation related to an automatic 
empathic response and thus did not instruct the subjects to empathize with the seen body 
language. This means that we had to conclude from the brain activation patterns we 
observed whether an empathic reaction had been generated or not. This approach, known 
as reverse inference is common practice in social neuroscience but also bears a certain risk 
when brain regions respond to multiple tasks. For example, this was the case for the DLFC 
which has been implicated in different aspects of executive control and decision-making (see 
above). However, we did not interpret activation of a brain region in isolation, but instead 
always focused on all activated brain areas which orchestrated a certain task. In addition, we 
carefully chose our control conditions that permitted us to subtract confounding brain 
activation. In manuscripts # 2 [117] & 3, the impact and neural correlates of subliminal facial 
expressions were studied. Despite the well-proven masking technique being applied, some 
participants had suspicions about the presence of hidden emotional expressions and 
speculated about the nature of the study. These subjects were excluded from data analysis 
because the stimuli were no longer subliminal in nature to them due to their lower threshold 
DISCUSSION AND OUTLOOK|36 
of conscious awareness. This has led to a relatively small sample size. However, due to the 
high number of repetitions per condition, we believe that this limitation is negligible.  
 
Taken together, the current dissertation sheds new light on how the brain processes 
various important aspects of emotional body language, as well as on the role of the DLFC in 
affect-related decisions. In addition, it provides new evidence which might explain the often 
observed decline in ToM abilities in higher adulthood.  
In future studies it would be interesting to apply the used paradigms to different 
patient groups which have been shown to be impaired in different aspects of emotion 
processing, e.g. patients with multiple sclerosis [182, 183], Parkinson’s disease [184, 185], or 
epilepsy [186, 187]. This could lead to a better understanding of the nature and extent of 
their impairment. In addition, comparing the performance and brain activation patterns of 
patients with those of old and young adults could give important insights into the 
mechanisms and origins of the observed deficits.  
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